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HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM AND INTIMATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Nan D. Hunter †

Illness is the night‐side of life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is born
holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick.
Susan Sontag1
Introduction
Sometimes what is implied and inferred can be as important as what is stated. In this
Article, I argue that the political debate that preceded the enactment of the Patient Protec‐
tion and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),2 as well as the legal debate that now swirls around
the question of its constitutionality, mask a foundational question about national identity.
PPACA, of course, does not literally constitute or reconstitute citizenship (although it does
require legal residence as the price of admission).3 But it creates the potential for broad
public conversation—as has never before occurred in the United States—regarding the
question of what the relationship should be between membership in the American com‐
munity and meaningful access to health care.
† Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Graduate Programs, Georgetown University Law Center. I very much appreciate
the research assistance provided by Katherine Record, Heather Sigler, and Kate Stewart and the editorial work by the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review staff.
1 Susan Sontag, Illness As Metaphor 3 (1978).
2 Pub. L. No. 111‐148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
3 See PPACA § 1312(f)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(f)(3) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (noting that qualified individuals, for the purpos‐
es of the Act, are only those who are citizens or aliens lawfully present).
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At face value, PPACA primarily seeks to make the individual and small‐group health in‐
surance markets rational and workable, to fill the enormous gap that has existed in cover‐
age, and to create insurance exchanges to regulate quality and police access.4 Upon full im‐
plementation, it will achieve nearly universal, but also probably quite uneven, coverage and
will perpetuate a deeply fragmented model of social insurance. If one imagines the health
care system as a political domain, with the various institutions and subsystems as compo‐
nents, PPACA is less like our Constitution and more like a reinvention of the Articles of Con‐
federation. Under PPACA, health insurance in the United States will remain a federated col‐
lection of risk pools, located in workplaces, public systems, and the new exchanges.
Nonetheless, the debate that has accompanied PPACA’s adoption is about something
bigger than spending curves, comparative effectiveness, or even medical‐loss ratios (not
that any of those should be considered trivial). The deep structure of this hyper‐technical
statute gestures to the existence of a health care universe that, in Habermasian terms, could
be its own lifeworld.5 For persons with chronic diseases, the health care system truly be‐
comes a world unto itself. For others, it may be more like a foreign country visited for an
intense but brief period of time, or perhaps one to which we pay little attention.6 Although
the internal operations of the health care universe are seldom thought of as political, its

4 I do not mean to diminish the importance of PPACA’s expansions of Medicare and especially Medicaid. I do not discuss
them in this article because they are extensions of existing programs, and I focus here on PPACA’s role in the creation of new in‐
stitutions and norms.
5 Habermas used the term “lifeworld” to describe major domains of social and individual life, such as the market or the
family. See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
353‐54 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
6 Thanks to Bill Sage for suggesting these analogies.

power is such that, upon entry, it may bring us life or death, profit or poverty, autonomy or
dependency.
In the interface between the health care system and the legal system, multiple legal pa‐
radigms are in play. For questions of access to care through insurance, a mixture of con‐
tract and social welfare principles dominate, implicating norms of social solidarity as well
as the exchange of defined promises and entitlements. As Lawrence Mead has noted, so‐
cial welfare programs that incorporate both benefits and reciprocal obligations provide
individuals with an “operational definition of citizenship.”7
PPACA creates a new social welfare and insurance program that redesigns access to
health care. Its precise impact on the social meanings associated with individual health and
the health of the nation is difficult to predict, but it almost certainly will be powerful. A dis‐
course on belonging, rights and obligations—a discourse on citizenship—is likely to evolve
as the effects of the reform take hold. If that occurs, the question will not be whether PPA‐
CA will provide some operational definition of what we understand to be the scope of social
citizenship, but how it does so; not if there will be some ethic of rights and obligations that
will develop around the new law, but what the content of that ethic will be. As in real, ra‐
ther than metaphorical, citizenship, belonging in the reformed health care system will be
defined in part by those who are not permitted to belong, and rights will be defined in part
by their circumscription. The determination of the validity of the individual mandate,

7 Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship 249 (1986).

which is occurring in the current litigation challenging the constitutionality of PPACA,8 will
profoundly shape the nature of its ethic of obligation.
The debates about PPACA illustrate that constitutional concepts are intertwined with
narrative understandings of government authority and individual rights and duties. The
trope of the “living Constitution,” for example, began with Franklin Roosevelt, who asserted
that we have a “living Constitution” as part of his argument that the Depression necessi‐
tated a more capacious scope for executive branch authority.9 More recently, the phrase
has figured prominently in debates over originalism and has been invoked as an interpre‐
tive premise for justifying heightened judicial review of laws curbing individual rights.10
PPACA may usher in yet another dimension of a “living Constitution”: not as a more expan‐
sive understanding of government power or of individual rights, but of our shared obliga‐
tions to one another.
This Article anticipates how the new health governance structures that PPACA creates
may reshape the social meanings, in addition to the finances and mechanics, of the Ameri‐
can health system. I develop a concept of “citizenship practices” to describe the compo‐
8 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
9 See Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power 304, 458‐59 (2010) (arguing that President Roosevelt strongly believed that the Justic‐

es’ belief in a “living Constitution” was necessary for his ambitious social programs to survive).
10 The phrase “living Constitution” has been used with distaste by some—and admiration by others—to describe
rights‐enhancing models of constitutional interpretation. Compare Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend‐
ment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (calling “deplorable” the fact that “the nature of the Constitution will change, often quite
dramatically, as the personnel of the Supreme Court changes”), and William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
Tex. L. Rev. 693, 706 (1976) (describing a view of a “living Constitution” that would allow “appointed federal judges to im‐
pose . . . a rule of conduct that the popular elected branches of governance would not have enacted” as “genuinely corrosive of the
fundamental values of our democratic society”), with Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living
Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1456, 1523 (2001) (noting that woman suffragists advanced the concept of a living Constitution by
looking behind the text and amplifying principles embedded within the document as “restorative of the commitments of American
democracy and mandated by the demands of reason”).

nents associated with the relationship between the individual and the collective. I argue
for using citizenship practices as a substitute for the overused metaphor of citizenship and
as a way of capturing the dynamic of belonging, rights, and obligations. This dynamic exists
in multiple social and political locations beyond the terms of the legal status of an individu‐
al with a particular sovereign state, and thus the frame of citizenship practices offers a bet‐
ter conceptual tool for understanding the social meaning of new patterns of behavior and
belief.
In analyzing citizenship practices related to PPACA, I address how the process by which
PPACA creates new institutions will shape the actions of individuals interacting with the
health system, including their participation in various, usually localized institutions of go‐
vernance. These new regularized practices have the potential to lead to new discourses and
understandings about the interrelationship between individualism and collectivity, and
about the public and private dimensions of the health system. The concept of citizenship
practices is intended to capture both the new activities and the new consciousness.
Of greatest importance to this emerging discourse is the individual mandate portion of
PPACA.11 Under the Act’s “minimum essential coverage” provision, all but a small number
of Americans must either purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.12 The individual
mandate requires most U.S. residents to obtain health insurance for themselves and their

11 PPACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010).
12 Id. The mandate applies to residents lawfully in the United States, except those who are incarcerated, who file a religious

conscience objection, or who participate in a preexisting health care sharing ministry. Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d). In addition, des‐
ignated exemptions are made for American Indians, individuals lacking insurance for three months or less, or those eligible for a
“hardship exemption” based on low income. Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e). Individuals eligible for a hardship exemption include
those for whom the cost of the lowest available plan after applicable subsidies are applied exceeds eight percent of income, those
with income less than the federal income tax filing threshold, or those otherwise defined by the Secretary to have “suffered a hard‐
ship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan.” Id.

dependents no later than 2014; those who do not comply will be subject to a tax penalty.13
Enrollment in most private sector health plans will satisfy the mandate; acceptable plans in‐
clude employer‐sponsored policies,14 policies sold on the individual market, existing health
plans grandfathered into the new regulations, or any other plan or policy providing “mini‐
mum essential coverage” as defined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.15 Those
who enroll in public plans such as Medicaid or Medicare will also be in compliance.16
Part I of this article provides a framework for analyzing the relationships between citi‐
zenship concepts and social insurance systems such as PPACA. I describe the inexactitude
of both theory and law as to the obligations of citizenship in the United States and discuss
the ways in which a tradition of consumer citizens has filled in some of the gaps in the social
meaning of citizenship. I also examine the role of social insurance programs, specifically as‐
sessing the Social Security system to demonstrate how a concrete model of social citizenship
can develop.
Part II turns to the specific example of PPACA and examines both the structural and
symbolic roles played by the individual mandate. I argue that the current litigation over

13 Id. § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b). The tax penalty will be the greater of a flat tax (starting at $95 in 2014, increasing
to $695 by 2016, and thereafter subject to cost‐of‐living adjustments) or an income‐based tax (starting at 1% of income in 2014,
increasing to 2.5% by 2016). Id. § 10106(b)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(2)(B); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010 § 1002, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(3)(d). A reduced (one‐half) penalty will apply for failure to insure children. PPACA
§ 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(3)(C). By 2016, penalties will be capped at the greater of 2.5% of income or three times the
individual penalty, and may not exceed the national average premium cost of the least expensive plan sold on the applicable ex‐
change. Id. § 10106(b)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(2)(B).
14 PPACA’s “pay or play” provision creates a mandate for large employers, requiring them to either offer employees a min‐
imum coverage option (play), cover the cost sharing subsidy, or provide a tax credit for employees to purchase coverage on an
exchange (pay). Id. § 1513(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H.
15 Id. § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(f).
16 Id.

the constitutionality of PPACA has generated a contest of signification between the compet‐
ing values associated with economic liberty and the social compact. Thus, while the Su‐
preme Court will decide whether the individual mandate is valid based on its interpretation
of congressional power under Article I, the popular understanding of this debate is much
more grounded in a contest of meaning over how much the individual can be forced to par‐
ticipate in a social insurance system.
Part III elaborates on the concept of citizenship practices and its usefulness in analyzing
structures for participation in American society. I explain the concept of citizenship prac‐
tices as referring to regularized behaviors and interactions with a system of governance
and a coherent (although not necessarily universal) set of beliefs about the meaning of
those behaviors. I then examine specific and concrete governance issues that must be ad‐
dressed in the implementation phases of PPACA and argue that the resolution of those
questions could enhance or inhibit an understanding of PPACA as a new form of social citi‐
zenship in the United States.
I. Social Insurance and the Epistemology of Citizenship
Social insurance programs operate, in many ways, as instruments of governance. They
channel, incentivize, and penalize behaviors; establish systems of rights and requirements;
distribute risks and provide a promise of collective security against shared risk; and define
membership in a collective undertaking.17 In social insurance, as in structures of govern‐
ment, a tension exists between the goals of collective good and of individual freedom. The
17 See generally Richard V. Ericson et al., Insurance as Governance 35‐46 (2003) (describing the collective sharing of
risk as “the hallmark of citizenship in strong social democracies”).

identification and pricing of risk, financed and subsidized by public funds, effectively im‐
plements redistributive policy decisions. Even private insurance performs critical social
functions: Tom Baker has described insurance law principles as a “guide to the social com‐
pact,”18 and Jeffrey Stempel argues that insurance policies function as “social institutions or
social instruments . . . often acting as adjunct arms of governance”19 and as “part of the so‐
cial policy infrastructure.”20
Pooling risk as a method of achieving security characterizes both social insurance pro‐
grams and private insurance policies. It is only in the former, however, that the shared un‐
derstandings of such systems create a sense of social solidarity. Social insurance exists in
an epistemological space where notions of common good intersect with beliefs about indi‐
vidual obligation. As a result, social insurance aligns with the conceptual trilogy of belong‐
ing, rights, and duties that is essential to any meaning of citizenship.21
This Part examines how the concepts and functioning of social insurance systems relate
to understandings of citizenship. The dominant theme in citizenship theory has been an ar‐
ticulation of rights. My focus is different: I look more deeply into the duties associated with
the citizen role and into the question of how program‐design structure can shape individual
participation in governance activities. I analyze how these components of citizenship as a so‐

18 Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 291 (1996).
19 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1489, 1495

(2010).

20 Id. at 1511.
21 See infra notes 22‐47 and accompanying text. I borrow the term “belonging” from Kenneth Karst and intend it to encom‐

pass norms of participation and social solidarity. See generally Kenneth Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and
the Constitution (1989).

cial role—rather than of citizenship as a formal legal status—operate in social insurance sys‐
tems.
In doing so, I apply insights from non‐legal scholarship about the interrelationship of
economic‐political notions of citizenship and the socio‐political role of consumers. What
political scientists have labeled as a right of participation in the private sector has histori‐
cally taken the form of consumer movements or, when limited to the workplace, of orga‐
nized labor. I analyze how PPACA offers the potential for testing whether individuals will
act as “consumer citizens” in the new health insurance system.
Finally, to establish a rough set of benchmarks for assessing the likely impact of PPACA
on understandings of citizenship, I conclude this Part with a discussion of Social Security.
A. The Obligations of Citizenship
Citizenship‐related scholarship has blossomed into an academic cottage industry in re‐
cent years,22 but the literature has incorporated health care only minimally into the various
categories and functions described by the leading theorists. Modern citizenship theory be‐
gan with the work of T. H. Marshall, who, writing in the late 1940s against the background
of a new British national health system, classified health care as a social right rather than a

22 See Margaret R. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship 12‐14 (2008) (“Since being awakened from a long dormancy at
the end of the twentieth century, studies of citizenship have been making up for lost time at a breathtaking pace.”). For recent
additions to the growing field of citizen‐related scholarship see, for example, Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien
(2008); Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society (1998).

political or civil right.23 Marshall treated health care as he did education, arguing that both
were essential to dignitary rights and “equality of status.”24
Marshall’s tripartite typology, with its social justice orientation and focus on the rela‐
tionship between citizenship and social inequality, addressed only the nature of the rights
that comprise citizenship.25 Two moves by later scholars of citizenship theory are particu‐
larly relevant to the project of understanding how American social insurance programs—
including PPACA’s new model—can be analyzed in terms of citizenship. First is the work of
scholars who have attempted to recuperate the centrality of obligations as part of the social
meaning of citizenship. Second is the addition of an independent right of participation to
Marshall’s model.
The dominant American tradition of liberal rights has long existed in a dialectical rela‐
tionship with a tradition of communitarian relationships and obligations.26 The concept of
citizenship as a reciprocal relationship dates from the liberal tradition that fueled the
American Revolution.27 In the same vein, Kenneth Karst’s work on the equal‐dignity un‐
derstanding of citizenship presupposes “two related and overlapping values: participation
23 See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class 54 (1950) (describing health care as a means of increasing general so‐
cial welfare and providing social rights).
24 Id. at 56 (arguing that provision of social services is not designed to equalize incomes, but rather to equalize status via
“class fusion” when all members of society share a “common experience”).
25 Marshall only briefly discussed concomitant obligations of citizenship. See id. at 60‐62 (giving examples of subordination
of individual rights to collective need in housing and education).
26 See, e.g., Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 201‐49 (1996) (dis‐
cussing the tension between the voluntarist conception of freedom and political control).
27 See Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship 8‐9 (1998)
(describing various schools of thought during the Revolutionary period grounded in the belief that individuals assumed obliga‐
tions to the state when accepting citizenship and that the state assumed reciprocal obligations); Linda K. Kerber, The Meanings of
Citizenship, 84 J. Am. Hist. 833, 833‐36 (1997) (asserting that the founding generation “constructed a new and reciprocal rela‐
tionship between state and citizen”).

and responsibility . . . . To be a citizen is not merely to be a consumer of rights, but to be re‐
sponsible to other members of the community.”28 Despite the conventional pairing of
rights and duties, there has been significantly less elaboration of the responsibility branch
than of the rights branch, either in political theory29 or in constitutional law or scholarship.
A robust debate about obligations of citizenship has emerged, however, in the legal chal‐
lenges to PPACA.
The law on citizen duties that does exist is structured in concentric circles, moving out‐
ward from those obligations linked to constitutional text to those that are at most implicit.
Beginning at the core, the Supreme Court has upheld congressional authority under Ar‐
ticle I’s enumerated powers to compel citizens to render military service30 and to file in‐
come tax returns and pay the appropriate taxes.31
The second concentric circle of citizenship duties includes those that one can reasona‐
bly infer from constitutional text. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that enacting
a statute that requires individuals to appear and testify in court upon service of a subpoena
falls within Congress’s powers.32 Even for this noncontroversial proposition, the Court
sought constitutional authority from multiple sources: historical tradition dating to Eliza‐
bethan England, references in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the rights of the accused

28 Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8‐9 (1977).
29 See Janoski, supra note 22, at 53 (stating that “citizenship theories . . . have tended to ignore duties and obligations”); id.

at 219 (describing obligations as the “theoretical stepchild” of citizenship theory). Although Janoski criticized the tendency of
theorists to overlook the obligations aspect of citizenship, his own taxonomy of citizens’ obligations is fairly shallow, concentrat‐
ing on the individual’s duty to provide financial support (presumably by paying taxes). Id. at 53‐56.
30 See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 387‐88 (1918) (stating that attacks on the constitutionality of a selective
draft law were flawed, as compulsory service is sanctioned by the text of the Constitution and grounded in historical practice).
31 See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17‐18 (1916) (finding that the Sixteenth Amendment’s income tax pro‐
visions are compatible with the unquestioned constitutional authority to levy income taxes).
32 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281‐82 (1919) (finding that personal obligations must be put aside at times
in order to perform one’s public duties, such as responding to a subpoena).

to certain incidents of trial, and historical understandings of the individual’s duty toward
the common good.33 Similarly, repeated references in the Constitution to juries34 implicitly
support the conclusion that requiring jury service is a concomitant necessary and proper
exercise of Congressional power, even without the explicit constitutional mention of such
service.
The third and outermost circle of citizenship duties encompasses the broad discretion
recognized under the state police powers doctrine.35 Where a state’s police powers are
implicated, the Court has invoked communitarian reasoning and rejected claims that an in‐
dividual’s constitutionally protected liberty was violated. For example, in Butler v. Perry,
the Court relied on “ancient usage and the unanimity of judicial opinion” to reject a Thir‐
teenth Amendment challenge to a state law requiring every able‐bodied adult male to con‐
tribute physical labor to the maintenance of public roads.36 Citing Blackstone’s Commenta‐
ries, which in turn cites Roman law, the Court justified the affirmative duty as a
contemporary extrapolation from the first of the trinoda necessitas, namely, repair of

33 See Blair, 250 U.S. at 281. On the final point, the Court elaborated that

the giving of testimony and the attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every person with‐
in the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform upon being properly summoned . . . . The personal sacrifice involved is
a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.
Id.
34 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . .”); id. amend. VI (granting the accused the right
to a trial “by an impartial jury”); id. amend. VII (granting the right to a jury trial at common law).
35 For example, in the mid‐nineteenth century, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared,
There are very many instances in which the citizen is required to perform personal service, or render aid to his government,
without other compensation than that of his participation in the general good, and his enjoyment of the general security and ad‐
vantage which result from common acquiescence in such obligations on the part of all the citizens alike, and which is essential to
the existence and safety of society.
West v. State, 1 Wis. 209, 234 (1853).
36 240 U.S. 328, 330 (1916).

bridges, construction of fortifications, and service in the militia.37 Because each community
was understood to have a duty to keep thoroughfares within its boundaries in good repair,
the obligation of each member of the community to provide labor without compensation to
maintain roads was “part of the duty which he owes to the public.”38
A strand of case law regarding citizenship‐linked duties also exists in public‐schooling
cases. Courts have upheld truancy laws that punished parents who did not send their
children to school on the understanding that public schools were “not so much a right
granted to the pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the public good”39 and a “guard
against the dangers of ‘incompetent citizenship.’”40 The concept of education as an appro‐
priate—and indeed enforceable—obligation of citizenship has endured.41
Beyond this handful of loosely related examples, however, there is considerable muddi‐
ness about precisely which obligations are understood to constitute duties of citizenship or
what unifying rationale they share. The parties challenging the constitutionality of PPACA
have used this lack of clarity to argue for the narrowest understanding of citizenship
norms. The word “draft” recurs in the debates over the individual mandate,42 for example,
and is used to delineate the sharp contrast that conservatives see between PPACA’s indi‐

37
38
39
40

Id. at 330‐31 (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *357)
Id. at 330.
Fogg v. Bd. of Educ., 82 A. 173, 175 (N.H. 1912).
Id.; see also State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170, 171 (N.H. 1929) (relying on Fogg for the proposition that requiring children to at‐
tend school betters society as a whole).
41 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (referring to education as a “general obligation of citizenship”);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (N.J. 1973) (finding that a system of school financing leading to disparate funding across
schools violated the state’s obligation to provide an adequate public school system).
42 For example, the Virginia Attorney General Kenneth Cuccinelli, a plaintiff in one of the challenges, argued, “This law‐
suit is not about health care, it’s about our freedom . . . . The government cannot draft an unwilling citizen into commerce just
so it can regulate him under the Commerce Clause.” David M. Drucker, Virginia Judge Allows Health Care Challenge to Pro‐
ceed, Roll Call (Aug. 2, 2010, 1:40 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/48911‐1.html; see also Matt Sissel, Health‐Care
Reform: Why I’m Suing to Get Back My Freedom, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 18185542
(“I object to being conscripted into a federal health‐care program . . . .”).

vidual mandate and those demands, such as Selective Service, that they do consider to be
indisputable obligations of citizenship. As the Cato Institute argued in its amicus brief in
the Virginia case, “To be sure, there are exceptional situations in which the federal govern‐
ment may mandate individual activity . . . [for example, the draft, jury duty, and payment of
income tax]. But these duties go to the heart of American citizenship.”43 Similarly, three
former Attorneys General of the United States argued in the same case that “the broad po‐
lice power of the States did . . . include some authority to require affirmative action—but
the duty was of the citizen to the state and was rooted in tradition.”44 In both instances, the
authors of the briefs apparently believed that to state the distinction between the duties of
citizenship and the obligation to join a national social insurance system was to prove it.
Whether access to health care (via health insurance) is a right has long been the master
frame of social justice debates in the realm of health. I would have predicted that the na‐
tional debates following enactment of a broad health reform law would have focused on the
extent of newly created rights. What is remarkable about the discourse that has emerged
from the constitutional challenges to PPACA so far is the extent to which its master frame is
over the proper scope of the individual’s obligations.

43 Memorandum of the Cato Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at
13, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)(No. 10‐0188) [hereinafter Memorandum of the Cato
Inst. et al.].
44 Memorandum of Amici Curiae, Former United States Attorneys General William Barr, et al., in Support of Plaintiff’s Mo‐
tion for Summary Judgment at 17‐18, Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 10‐0188).

B. Participation Rights and Citizen Consumers
Traditional approaches to citizenship, such as Marshall’s, have engaged only questions
of the individual’s relationship to the state. The perspective of citizenship as a social role,
however, opens up a broader view that can take a more functional approach to citizenship
practices. One such function centers on participation, an element not necessarily limited to
the state or to purely public institutions.
Thomas Janoski has argued that participation rights form a fourth category, in addition
to Marshall’s typology, of the incidents of citizenship.45 Janoski defines participation rights
as “individual and group rights to participate in private decision making through some
measure of control over markets, organizations, and capital,” with most of his examples fo‐
cused on workers and labor unions.46
PPACA creates new opportunities for effectuation of a participation right outside gov‐
ernment, not in the employment context but in the potential for the role of consumer to
overlap with that of citizen. The border between being a citizen and being a consumer is es‐
pecially porous in the health care system.47 A deep public‐private dual identity permeates
PPACA’s structure, just as it has long been pervasive in the health care system; the individual
mandate’s command to purchase insurance products on the private market is one of count‐
less examples of its manifestation. A correlative right of participation should be viewed as
reciprocal to the individual’s obligation to purchase insurance.

45 See Janoski, supra note 22, at 28‐33 (arguing that most theorists have failed to recognize participation rights).
46 Id. at 32.
47 Cf. Nan D. Hunter, Rights Talk and Patient Subjectivity: The Role of Autonomy, Equality, and Participation Norms, 45

Wake Forest L. Rev. 1525, 1545‐47 (2010) (“[T]he American health care system is being actively reshaped by the expectations
of consumers and consumer‐centric financial incentives.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

New scholarship, primarily in history, has sought to recuperate the idea that consumer
experiences can enhance the potential for greater involvement in political activities and for
strengthening of democratic values. The work of Lizabeth Cohen especially suggests that
“citizen” and “consumer” are not necessarily an antithetical, dichotomous, or mutually ex‐
clusive pairing in American politics.48 Cohen’s work has excavated a progressive “consum‐
er citizen” identity that flowered during the New Deal.49
Government officials during the Roosevelt administration sought both to strengthen
and to draw strength from national consumer organizations, declaring that a governance
role for consumers would “put the market power of the consumer to work politically.”50
Presidential speeches validated the right of consumers “to have their interests represented
in the formulation of government policy.”51 Formal bodies for direct consumer representa‐
tion were established within the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the Office of
Price Administration (OPA) (during World War II), the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the
Rural Electrification Administration.52 Both the NRA and the OPA set up state and local
consumer advisory groups as well.53 This focus on active participation built on and ex‐
panded the notion of consumer politics developed during the Progressive Era, when re‐
48 See Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America 8 (2003)
(“[C]itizen and consumer were ever‐shifting categories that sometimes overlapped, often were in tension, but always reflected
the permeability of the political and economic spheres.”); see also T.H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consum‐
er Politics Shaped American Independence, at XV‐XVII (2004) (arguing that the consumer experiences of colonists helped fa‐
cilitate mobilization for the American Revolution).
49 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 23‐37, 66‐112 (describing the New Deal’s “growing attentiveness to consumers as a way
of . . . protecting . . . the public interest”).
50 Id. at 8.
51 Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted).
52 Id. at 28‐31, 66‐67.
53 Id. at 66‐67.

forms were enacted to protect purchasers from tainted products, but consumer represent‐
atives did not join decisionmaking bodies.54
Cohen argues that the consumer‐citizen framework emerged during the 1930s as a po‐
litically “acceptable way of promoting the public good” without invoking overtly socialist
rhetoric, and as a tactic for melding democratic values with the preservation of capital‐
ism.55 Both of these objectives resonate with the political history of PPACA as well. What
Tom Baker describes elsewhere in this volume as the trade‐off in PPACA between social so‐
lidarity and the insurance law precept of fair (i.e., actuarially justified) discrimination56
speaks to the same perceived political need to balance themes of collective responsibility
with those of individualism that Cohen discerned in the New Deal.
A note of caution is in order. I do not mean to overstate the progressive potential for
consumer citizen politics. Access to health care in the United States has long turned on a
bargained‐for form of “belonging” to what is typically a private market risk pool without
any meaningful accompanying rights.57 On this view, the political relationship of individu‐
als to the American health care system illustrates what Margaret Somers has described as
54 See id. at 21‐23 (describing the efforts to organize consumer advocacy groups and to pass legislation in the early 1900s).
55 Id. at 23.
56 Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. Pa. L.

Rev. XX, XX (2011) (“[T]he [PPACA] extends the fair share approach to health care financing by bringing more people under the
health insurance umbrella. At the same time, the Act extends the nondiscrimination vision of what constitutes a fair share from
the large‐group market into the individual and small‐group market.”).
57 Since 1974, the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006), has dominated
regulation of the biggest chunk of the health insurance market employer‐sponsored plans. ERISA does not require employers to
offer health benefits, nor does it offer any correlative right of employees to gain access to coverage. Generally, the terms of ERISA
have been interpreted to limit liability to plans should employers breach contracts with their employee enrollees. See, e.g., Ka‐
therine L. Record, Note, Wielding the Wand Without Facing the Music: Allowing Utilization Review Physicians to Trump Doctors’
Orders, but Protecting Them from the Legal Risk Ordinarily Attached to the Medical Degree, 59 Duke L.J. 955, 967 (2010) (noting
that ERISA allows recovery of benefits denied but not compensatory or punitive damages—a remedies system that was created for
breach of pension). ERISA frames the bulk of American health insurance as a voluntaristic auxiliary in a broader free market sys‐
tem. Id. It narrowly protects contractual benefits, and has been interpreted to preempt any claim relating to a plan that would col‐
lect further damages (e.g., state law claims of negligence, emotional distress, wrongful death, medical malpractice, and bad faith).
Id. at 968 n.63. Under ERISA, the “citizen” is a utility maximizing rational actor entitled to the protection of a state apparatus for
her bargained‐for deserts.

only a thin form of “contractualized” citizenship.58 This kind of link between citizenship
and consumer activities points to an understanding of governance as stakeholder plural‐
ism, rather than as a reinforcement of social solidarity norms. Consistent with that con‐
cern, the normative values associated with a contract‐based understanding of citizenship in
the health care system speak less to social solidarity than to the individual’s capacity to
identify and purchase coverage that will most closely match her cost and quality prefe‐
rences.59
However, it would also be a mistake to dismiss entirely the potential for mobilization
that attends participation in market‐oriented activities and practices. The experience of con‐
sumer citizenship in the 1930s succeeded in two key respects important for a project linked
to progressive values: democratic norms and practices reached federal, state, and local levels
of governance, and the resulting institutions went beyond representation of consumer inter‐
ests to the establishment of systems for consumer participation in policymaking. Cohen’s
work demonstrates that the participatory mechanisms for consumers during the New Deal
did not exist simply as rote formalities, but that citizen consumers were genuinely engaged in
that effort as well.60 This history of broadly diffused engagement suggests that social insur‐
ance programs, including PPACA, could produce effective venues for citizenship practices.

58 See Somers, supra note 22, at 2‐3, 68‐73 (arguing that contractual citizenship creates groups of citizens who are in‐
cluded in the accompanying rights and groups who are excluded).
59 It is not surprising, for example, that PPACA itself contains the term “educated health care consumer,” defined as “an in‐
dividual who is knowledgeable about the health care system, and has background or experience in making informed decisions
regarding health, medical, and scientific matters.” PPACA § 10104(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18024(e) (West Supp. 1B 2010).
60 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 29‐31, 34.

C. Social Security
When analyzing an American social insurance scheme, the inevitable comparison is to
Social Security, which obligates each working individual to pay a dedicated tax to support
the program.61 Although now a universal system, Social Security originated as a poverty‐
amelioration program, in which Congress silently perpetuated gender, race, and income in‐
equalities.62 It was only over time that the Social Security Act “established American social
citizenship.”63
Similarly to PPACA, the threshold legal challenge to Social Security focused on the con‐
stitutionality of its financing component, which, unlike the individual mandate in PPACA,
was clearly structured as a tax.64 The Court found the Social Security Act constitutional
pursuant to Congress’s taxing power, without having to consider the scope of the Com‐
merce Clause.65 Yet the logic of the challenge nonetheless parallels the political arguments
61 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). Various taxes enacted under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act finance the Social Security
program. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a)(2006).
62 Social Security was originally divided between benefits—framed as earnings from worker contributions—and assistance
to the needy. See Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy 55‐59 (1998)
(chronicling the evolution of ideas on how to implement the Social Security system). Moreover, the system initially excluded
agricultural and domestic workers, thus eliminating coverage for half of the African‐American population at that time. See Jennifer
Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor and the Shaping of America’s Public‐Private Welfare State 104 (2003) (noting
that bifurcating Social Security directly resulted in the exclusion of several groups, including African‐Americans).
63 Mettler, supra note 62, at 54. In 1939, Congress expanded Social Security to allow benefits greater than the amount that
the deceased worker had paid in, thus moving away from a “contributory‐contractual principle” to a genuine social insurance
model, in which government assumed the employee’s responsibility to his family by providing income security. Brian R. Gross‐
man et al., One Nation, Interdependent: Exploring the Boundaries of Citizenship in the History of Social Security and Medicare, in
Leah Rogne et al., Social Insurance and Social Justice: Social Security, Medicare, and the Campaign Against Entitlements
115, 127 (2009).
64 Then–Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins credited the clarity of constitutional authority for Social Security to advice she
received in 1934 from Chief Justice Harlan Stone: “The taxing power, my dear, the taxing power. You can do anything under the
taxing power.” Francis Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, Speech at the Social Security Administration: The Roots of Social Security (Oct.
at
http://www.ssa.gov/
23,
1962),
available
history/perkins5.html.
65 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640‐41 (1937). The Supreme Court left open the question of the constitutionality of the
tax on individual employees, limiting its holding to the claims brought by employers. See id. at 645 (stating only that the tax on
employers was valid). Plaintiffs in the challenges to PPACA accept the Social Security tax as a constitutionally legitimate exercise
of congressional taxing power, but argue that Helvering provides no support for PPACA because PPACA is financed by a mandate
to purchase a private commodity, rather than to pay monies to the government. See, e.g., Memorandum of the Cato Inst. et al.,
supra note 43, at 19 (“Although the term ‘excise’ now covers virtually every internal revenue tax except the income tax, the indi‐

being made against PPACA, and the Court’s reasoning in response implies the kind of civic
solidarity justification that could be mounted to defend the new law in non‐doctrinal ar‐
guments.
In the Social Security case, the First Circuit had ruled the Act unconstitutional as a viola‐
tion of the Tenth Amendment, on the ground that providing assistance to the elderly and
poor was a power reserved to the states and not legitimately within Congressional authori‐
ty.66 Moreover, it found that “a tax imposed to benefit slightly over half of the people over
sixty‐five years of age and who are the care or burden of the states cannot be said to be im‐
posed for the general welfare of the United States.”67
Justice Cardozo’s opinion for the Supreme Court reasoned that although “Congress may
spend money in aid of the ‘general welfare[,]’ . . . [t]he line must still be drawn between one
welfare and another, between particular and general.”68 The Court rejected a “static” con‐
cept of the general welfare: “Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be in‐
terwoven in our day with the well‐being of the Nation. What is critical or urgent changes
with the times.”69 The Court also found the new system to be an appropriate response to
urgent need:

vidual mandate penalty (unlike Social Security) is not a tax on employment or other action—it ‘taxes’ inaction.”).
66 Davis v. Edison Elec. Illuminated Co. of Bos., 89 F.2d 393, 395 (1st Cir. 1937), rev’d sub nom. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937).
67 Id. at 395.
68 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
69 Id. at 641.

Spreading from State to State, unemployment is an ill not particular but general,
which may be checked, if Congress so determines, by the resources of the Na‐
tion . . . . [Nation‐wide harm results regardless of] whether men are thrown out of
work because there is no longer work to do or because the disabilities of age make
them incapable of doing it. Rescue becomes necessary irrespective of the cause.70
These passages in Helvering performed significant work in the Social Security debate
and are extraordinarily rich for present purposes as well. The Court invokes the norms of
reciprocal and collective responsibility—“rescue”—that comprise the ethos of citizenship.
Further, Justice Cardozo uses the language of emergency—a “nation‐wide calamity . . .
[s]preading from State to State”71—to ground the necessity for collective mobilization of the
sort associated with self‐defense and national security. The opinion frames the threat as one
to the nation as a whole, requiring a specifically national response, warning of the hazards of
relying on multiple state old‐age pension systems, and cautioning that “[o]nly a power that is
national can serve the interests of all.”72
Today, paying Social Security taxes is rarely questioned as falling outside an American’s
reasonable

expectation

of

the

obligations

of

citizenship, even though Social Security is certainly not essential to the existence of any
government. Yet the program functions as an institution or technology of societal solidari‐
ty at a sufficiently deep level that it constitutes part of the social meaning of citizenship.

70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 644.

Indeed, political scientist Angela Campbell, who has studied Social Security extensively,
concludes that it has been a major factor in making seniors the “[ü]ber‐citizens” of Ameri‐
can politics.73 On other political issues, senior engagement is no higher than that of other
persons; it is the specific interest in Social Security that has led to a relatively larger politi‐
cal presence for that demographic group.74 Campbell credits program design and adminis‐
tration, as well as financial support provided by the benefits, with having created the con‐
ditions that have produced this result.75 Most impressively, Social Security has produced a
phenomenon in which low‐income beneficiaries have become more active than
high‐income seniors on issues specific to Social Security.76
Engagement by participants has led, in turn, to modifications that have expanded the
scope of the program.77 Social Security created an identifiable constituency group that at‐
tracted interest‐group entrepreneurs and political parties, who in turn mobilized greater
levels of engagement by program enrollees, who themselves identified gaps in coverage
that require additional political action.78

This process effectively transformed the

low‐income elderly—a socially anonymous and diffuse group—into a political power base
that became politically legible as discrete and organized, even while remaining diffuse.79

73 Andrea Louise Campbell, How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State 2

(2003).
74
75
76
77
78
79

See id. at 48 (“[S]eniors’ general political engagement is not higher than that of nonseniors.”).
Id. at 136.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 112‐14.

The examples of Social Security and New Deal citizen consumer institutions illustrate
the power of law to shape cognition and understanding in situations in which meaning is
ambiguous and malleable. Social insurance programs can redefine concrete reality and, in
the process, alter popular expectations of what are appropriate attitudes and behaviors.
II. The Individual Mandate as Linchpin and Signifier
A robust debate about the obligations of citizenship has emerged as part of the political
discourse surrounding constitutional challenges to PPACA. In this Part, I describe the
structural and symbolic importance of the individual mandate to the overall reform effort
and to the citizenship‐linked meanings of the legislation. Although the provision creating
the individual mandate accounted for much of the resistance to the bill, its proponents in‐
sisted on its inclusion as the cornerstone of the legislation because it provided a mechan‐
ism to address a dysfunctional insurance market.80
On the surface, the litigation over whether it is constitutional to require individuals to
purchase health insurance policies concerns the scope of the Commerce and the Necessary
and Proper Clauses, as well as the applicability of the taxing power. In the subtext to those
arguments are the radically different visions of the meaning of the social obligations of citi‐
zenship that are fueling popular understandings and debates over the social meaning of the
new law.

80 See, e.g., Press Release, House Comm. on Ways and Means, Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms
(Apr. 15, 2009) (quoting Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel as saying that “America’s health insurance mar‐
ket is dysfunctional,” evidenced by “the 87 million people who went without health insurance during the past two years and the
millions more who have insurance that is increasingly unaffordable or inadequate”).

A. Economic Necessity
In the years leading up to the enactment of PPACA, two economic dynamics dominated
the health insurance market: prohibitive cost (with premiums increasing at a faster rate
than the rate of growth in income) and decreasing participation (forty‐six million unin‐
sured in 2007, with one in four households forgoing necessary medical care due to cost).81
Expanding access to coverage required reforming two profit‐boosting strategies that un‐
derlay these problems: medical underwriting and discrimination based on preexisting
conditions. The mandate was essential to PPACA’s structure for tightening regulatory con‐
trol without abandoning a market‐based health insurance system.
Medical underwriting—structuring premiums inversely with health status—created an
insurance landscape that made coverage increasingly unaffordable to those most likely to
need care. Thus, to expand coverage to the sickest Americans, Congress had to eliminate
underwriting and require insurers to adhere to community‐rated premiums (e.g., to charge
all beneficiaries with the same premium, subject only to age variation).82 In doing so, Con‐
gress sought not only to increase affordability of coverage, but also to incentivize insurers

81 Id.
82 See Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,

111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Uwe E. Reinhardt, Professor, Princeton University) (noting that health care will never be avail‐
able to “all Americans on equal terms” as long as insurance companies practiced underwriting, and advocating community‐rated
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
premiums
instead),
available
cgi‐bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:52258.pdf.

to design and implement effective cost‐containment strategies, thereby controlling growth
in national health care expenditures.83
Discrimination based on pre‐existing conditions (e.g., denying or rescinding coverage
for health conditions pre‐dating policy enrollment) had shut off access to insurance for
many patients in immediate need of care. To facilitate coverage of high‐cost health care
services, Congress required insurers to offer guaranteed issue and guaranteed renewal of
coverage, and limited insurers’ ability to mask unexpected exclusions of coverage in cum‐
bersome contracts.84 In addition, Congress required coverage of “essential benefits,” and
restricted the cost‐sharing arrangements that had discouraged individuals from seeking
preventive care before becoming ill.85
The purpose of prohibiting medical underwriting and discrimination based on preexisting
conditions was to open the insurance market to individuals of all health statuses, thereby ex‐
panding coverage to many of those in greatest need. Yet requiring insurers to take on
high‐risk beneficiaries at lower cost—without mandating that healthy individuals join insur‐

83 Only one percent of patients account for more than one quarter of health care spending, with five percent accounting for

approximately half. Samuel H. Zuvekas & Joel W. Cohen, Prescription Drugs and the Changing Concentration of Health Care Ex‐
penditures, 26 Health Aff. 249, 251 exhibit 2 (2007). This trend remained consistent even through the managed care movement
of the 1990s, suggesting that insurers were not designing effective cost‐containment policies that would constrain national med‐
ical expenditures. Id. at 249‐50; see also The Tri‐Committee Draft Proposal for Health Care Reform, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 72 (2009) (statement of Jacob Hacker, Co‐Director, Berkeley School of Law Center on Health Economic
& Family Security) (explaining how insurance markets compete for the lowest‐risk enrollees rather than price or quality of care),
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi‐bin/
available
getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:50479.pdf.
84 PPACA sec. 1201, §§ 2702–2703, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg‐1 to ‐2 (West Supp. 1A 2010).
85 An essential benefits package, to be defined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, will establish the minimal
amount of benefits a plan may offer on the exchange. Id. § 1302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1) (West Supp. 1B 2010). In addi‐
tion, plans sold on the exchange must cover at least sixty percent of health care costs, id. § 1302(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d)(1),
and out‐of‐pocket expenditures may not exceed $5,000 for an individual or $10,000 for a family. Id. § 1302(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §
18022(c)(1). Section 1001 of the Act also amends the Public Health Services Act to prohibit cost sharing for evidence‐based pre‐
ventive services. Id. § 1001, 42 U.S.C.A. 300gg‐13(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010).

ance pools—would have killed the private market by simultaneously reducing premium in‐
come and increasing expenditures.86
State‐based reforms had demonstrated this effect. For example, Congress considered
the experience of New Jersey’s Individual Health Coverage Program of 1993, which re‐
quired insurers to use guaranteed issue and community‐based ratings on the individual
market, but did not require uninsured residents to obtain coverage.87 Within a decade, the
state’s insurance market began to flounder, as the proportion of high‐risk to low‐risk bene‐
ficiaries increased.88 By failing to require healthy individuals to purchase insurance before
they fall ill, and securing affordable rates for people of all health statuses, the law incenti‐
vized free riding and prohibited insurers from minimizing adverse selection.89 In contrast
to the New Jersey experience, health reform in Massachusetts demonstrated the stability
that an individual mandate can bring to risk pooling. Within three years of imposing its
mandate, Massachusetts experienced an increase in insurance coverage for non‐elderly
adult from 87.5% to 95%.90

86 See Health Reform in the 21st Century, supra note 82, at 13 (statement of Uwe E. Reinhardt) (arguing that the “imposition of
community‐rate premiums and guaranteed issue on a market of competing private insurers will inexorably drive that market into ex‐
tinction”).
87 See id. at 13 n.4 (citing Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets in
New Jersey, 23 Health Aff. 167 (2004)).
88 See Monheit et al., supra note 87, at 169 (describing a trend of enrollment consistent with “a marketwide ad‐
verse‐selection death spiral”).
89 See id. (noting that insurers have been forced to retain “potentially adverse health risks”).
90 Sharon K. Long & Karen Stockley, Health Reform in Massachusetts: An Update as of Fall 2009, at iii ( 2010); see
also PPACA § 10106(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (describing the “Effects on the National Economy and
Interstate Commerce” of the individual mandate and stating that “[i]n Massachusetts, a similar requirement has strengthened
private employer‐based coverage: despite the economic downturn, the number of workers offered employer‐based coverage has
actually increased.”).

Taking into account the experience of state‐based insurance reform, Congress used a
mandate to mitigate the effects of eliminating the insurance industry’s primary means of
maximizing profit.91 The mandate allows insurers to effectively pool risk: offsetting the cost
of insuring high‐risk beneficiaries at affordable rates with the profits earned on healthy be‐
neficiaries.92 In other words, the mandate eliminates two market failures: free‐riding and
improper risk analysis.93
Congress also found the mandate important for addressing issues related to employ‐
er‐sponsored coverage: continuity in coverage and variability in plans. In light of the in‐
crease in lateral career movement, Congress concluded that a mandate would incentivize
employees to remain covered during the transition between old and new employer plans.94
It would also enhance the accessibility of coverage for the self‐employed, unemployed, or
underemployed, or those working in small businesses that lack risk‐pooling capacity.95
PPACA creates state‐based health insurance exchanges in order to provide a vehicle for ob‐
taining coverage outside of large employer‐sponsored or public plans.96 Without the
mandate, the financial stability of the exchanges might falter under the force of adverse se‐

91 See Health Reform in the 21st Century, supra note 82, at 9, 101‐02 (noting that health reform in New Jersey resulted in
an unraveling of the insurance market due to the lack of a mandate).
92 See id. at 107 (testimony of William Vaughan, Senior Policy Analyst, Consumers Union) (noting that a mandate removes the
business necessity of imposing limitations the coverage of on pre‐existing conditions); id. at 118‐19 (statement of the American Acad‐
emy of Actuaries) (noting that with larger risk pools, insurers can charge lower rates).
93 Representative Schwartz discussed the problem of improper risk analysis seen in young adults tending to underestimate
the future risk of accumulating medical costs. Id. at 106‐07 (statement of Rep. Allyson Schwartz, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).
94 There is often either a six‐month waiting period to enroll in a new employer’s plan or an annual thirty to sixty day

enrollment window. Id. at 103‐05.
95 See id. at 35‐37, 40, 94, 110‐16 (discussing insurance barriers for those unable to pool risk).
96 PPACA § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010).

lection. Thus, the primary role of the individual mandate is to stabilize the private health
insurance market.97
B. A Signification Contest Between Economic Liberty
and the Social Compact
Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of PPACA have targeted the individual
mandate.98 The resolution of these claims, almost certainly by the Supreme Court, will turn
on whether the requirement to purchase health insurance is an appropriate exercise of
Congressional power under either the Commerce Clause or the taxing power. There seems
to be little dispute that this precise form of federal mandate—that individuals must purchase
certain private goods or pay a penalty—is unprecedented.99 The Court’s resolution may de‐
pend on whether the Justices calibrate their analysis at a greater or lesser level of generality,
by deciding whether the PPACA mandate is a reasonable way to regulate a trillion‐dollar
economic subsystem or whether it is more like an authoritarian command that each individ‐
97 But the individual mandate will not remedy all troubles of adverse selection within the insurance exchanges. See Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Commonwealth Fund, Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act: Eight Difficult Issues 9
(2010) (describing how the continued existence of a market outside the exchange will leave open the possibility of adverse selec‐
tion).
98 See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10‐091, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011);
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010); New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10‐1489,
2010 WL 5060597 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10‐0015, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); U.S.
Citizens Ass’n. v. Sebelius, No. 10‐1065, 2010 WL 4947043 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2010); Shreeve v. Obama, No. 10‐0071, 2010 WL
4628177 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D.
Fla. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010). A number of cases were also filed in which
no court opinion had been issued as of April 5, 2011. See Amended Complaint, Bryant v. Holder, No. 10‐0076 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4,
2011); Complaint, Coons v. Geithner, No. 10‐1714 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2010); Complaint, Calvey v. Obama, No. 10‐0353 (W.D. Okla.
Aug. 6, 2010); Complaint, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Sebelius, No. 10‐0499 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2010).
99 See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (quoting a 1994 CBO memorandum determining that the individual mandate
would be “an unprecedented form of federal action”); see generally Jennifer Staman, Cong. Research Serv., R40725, Requiring
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 1 (Dec. 16, 2010) (noting that Congress has never re‐
quired the transfer of money to private parties except in return for a privilege, such as driving cars).

ual must buy a health club membership. In my view, for reasons well stated by Mark Hall,100
there is no basis for the Court to conclude that the Act is unconstitutional.
My focus in this Article is not on the doctrinal analysis of the debate that will be before
the Supreme Court but on the underlying social messages and meanings that are implicated
in that debate. In cultural terms, the Court will have to decide whether PPACA is about pre‐
serving a fiscally and otherwise healthy collectivity—the nation—or about preserving an in‐
dividually defined bundle of rights. Perhaps subconsciously, the Justices must frame the rela‐
tionship between government and individual access to the health care system as primarily
either about collective governance or about fostering individual self‐governance. Fundamen‐
tally, the legitimacy of the individual mandate turns on whether the Court will accept that a
sacrifice of individual economic liberty is justified by an obligation to contribute to the com‐
mon good that accompanies membership in the American political community.
The centrality of economic liberty claims to the individual mandate debate is evident
from the current litigation, in which individual plaintiffs have described the harm they suf‐
fer from the allegedly unconstitutional exercise of power in economic terms. In Florida ex
rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, for example, one
plaintiff asserted that he had no health insurance nor any intention of purchasing any, and
that, further, “he is, and expects to remain, financially able to pay for his own healthcare

100 See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. XX, XX (2011) (arguing that

Congress is permitted to regulate the insurance industry and that the individual mandate is necessary and proper to that permis‐
sion).

services if and as needed.”101 In Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, the District Court
found that the individual plaintiffs had standing because of the present injury of
being compelled to ‘reorganize their [financial] affairs’ . . . . Plaintiffs’ decision to fo‐
rego certain spending today, so that they will have the funds to pay for health insur‐
ance when the Individual Mandate takes effect in 2014, are injuries fairly traceable to
the Act for the purposes of conferring standing. There is nothing improbable about
the contention that the Individual Mandate is causing plaintiffs to feel economic
pressure today.102
These assertions recall two cases decided by the Supreme Court slightly more than a
century ago which also concerned the legitimacy of a health‐related mandate grounded in
social

welfare

policy.

In

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld a requirement that every resident of Cam‐
bridge, Massachusetts, be vaccinated for smallpox, rejecting the argument that it violated
bodily liberty.103 Less than two months later, in Lochner v. New York, the Court upheld the
primacy of economic liberty and the right of contract by invalidating a law that set a maxi‐
mum daily number for hours worked, a law that looked like a present‐day occupational
health and safety regulation.104

101 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
102 720 F. Supp. 2d at 888‐89.
103 See 197 U.S. 11, 12‐13, 26‐27 (1905) (“[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution . . . does not import an absolute right in

each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”).
104 See 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (“The Act is not, within any
fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals . . . .”).

The contemporary controversy over the legitimacy of the individual mandate in PPACA
resonates with these two constitutional landmarks, not at the level of doctrine or precedent
but in the realm of social meaning. At bottom, both Jacobson and Lochner concerned how
much sacrifice of liberty could be demanded of the individual by the state in the interest of
furthering the social compact, specifically in the context of health. In each case, the Court
had to determine how direct or necessary the sacrifice of a right was to achieving the com‐
mon good. In Jacobson, the Court framed the justification for coerced vaccination as neces‐
sary, literally, for community survival, a linkage that made sense in the context of an epi‐
demic of infectious disease at the turn of the last century:105 “Upon the principle of
self‐defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.”106 The Court also de‐
scribed the individual’s duty as part of a social compact with the state:
There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good . . . . This court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental
principle that “persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State;
of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon ac‐

105 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children—United States,
1900–1998, 281 JAMA 1482, 1482 (1999) (“At the beginning of the 20th century, infectious diseases were widely prevalent in
the United States and exacted an enormous toll on the population. For example, in 1900, 21,064 smallpox cases were reported,
and 894 patients died.”).
106 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.

knowledged general principles ever can be made, so far as natural persons are con‐
cerned.”107
By contrast, the same Court in Lochner viewed the maximum hours law as an illegiti‐
mate ruse used to curtail the dynamics of the labor market:
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is an illegal in‐
terference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employés [sic], to
make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which
they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts.108
The Court’s reasoning in both cases, together with the citizenship cases and Helvering, de‐
monstrates that as context and historical circumstance shift, so do the formulations of a cit‐
izen’s duty.
There are, of course, many ways to distinguish these two cases from the PPACA law‐
suits. Perhaps the most important difference is that Jacobson and Lochner involved the in‐
vocation of a state’s police power,109 rather than the invocation by Congress of its powers
under Article I. And of course, the Lochner era has long since ended;110 unless plaintiffs can
demonstrate that a noneconomic, fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States

107 Id. at 26 (citations omitted) (quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1854)).
108 198 U.S. at 61.
109 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25 (“According to settled principles, the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at

least, such reasonable regulations . . . as will protect the public health and the public safety.”); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54 (describing
the act at issue as an “assumed exercise of [the state’s] police power”).
110 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (“The holding in Lochner has been implicitly overruled many times.”);
Day‐Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (recognizing the implied overruling of Lochner’s holding).

need only show that PPACA’s individual mandate satisfies rational basis review.111 With
evidence that Congress went to considerable lengths to clarify that the mandate is neces‐
sary to the entire statutory scheme, the Michigan court had little difficulty dismissing plain‐
tiffs’ substantive due process claims.112 Thus, the doctrinal resolution of the constitutional‐
ity of the mandate centers on the Commerce Clause and tax power, augmented by the Ne‐
Necessary and Proper Clause, and not on recognition of an economic liberty interest.
At the level of social meaning, however, PPACA challenges are not about federalism, the
Commerce Clause, or taxation. Just as today I would doubt that a person quarantined after
arriving on a flight from New York to Los Angeles would much care whether federal or
state health authorities ordered the quarantine,113 I doubt that the final ruling on the con‐
stitutionality of the individual mandate will be understood as resolving the question of
which level of government has the power to force an individual into a community‐rating in‐
surance system. Rather, the popular understanding likely will center on the issue of
whether persons can be compelled by any level of government to participate in a social in‐
surance compact for the common good, or whether, when the rational economic choice of
particular individuals would be to go it alone, a requirement to obtain health insurance
would amount to what the Lochner court called “meddlesome interference[] with the rights
of the individual.”114

111 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891‐92 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (stating that the court should deter‐
mine only whether there is a rational basis for the conclusion that the regulated activities substantially affect interstate com‐
merce).
112 Id. at 893‐95 (explaining Congress’s rational basis for passing PPACA).
113 Federal quarantine authority is limited to situations in which an individual with a communicable disease may cross
state lines. See 42 U.S.C. § 264(d) (2006).
114 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

In the debates over the validity of PPACA that occur outside the confines of litigation
briefs, these broader themes of social meaning dominate. One main strategy of PPACA’s
opponents has been to persuade legislatures in six states to adopt “health insurance free‐
dom” laws that would prohibit any individual mandate, state or federal.115 In the 2010
election, voters in Arizona and Oklahoma amended their state constitutions to add the lan‐
guage of “health insurance freedom.”116 The primary purpose of these amendments is not
the creation of new law. “Health insurance freedom” language adds nothing to disputes
over whether the mandate exceeds the power of Congress. It is a makeweight for purposes
of Tenth Amendment analysis. If the individual mandate is found to be within the scope of
Article I powers, it will trump any and all conflicting state laws by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause. The value of the “health insurance freedom” campaign to its proponents lies in the
very process of enactment—in the opportunity created by the legislative debates and elec‐

115 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 31‐1‐11 (Lexis through 2010 Reg. Sess. 2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 39‐9003 (Supp. 2010); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:10186 (Supp. 15 2011); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.330 (West, Westlaw through April 13, 2011); Va. Code Ann. art.
4.1, § 38.2‐3430.1:1 (Supp. 6A 2010); . The American Legislative Exchange Council, an organization that “advocates limited gov‐
ernment and free markets,” provided instruction to several states in developing these laws. Monica Davey, Health Care Overhaul
and Mandatory Coverage Stir States’ Rights Claims, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2009, at A25; see also Press Release, Am. Legislative
Exch.
Council,
Freedom
of
Choice
in
Health
Care
Act,
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FOCA&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15323 (last visited Mar.
15, 2011) (noting that forty‐two states have utilized this model act in introducing or announcing health insurance freedom laws).
The language of the Virginia statute is typical:
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he has or is eligible for health insurance coverage under any policy or
program provided by or through his employer, or a plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the federal government, shall be
required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage except as required by a court or the Department of So‐
cial Services where an individual is named a party in a judicial or administrative proceeding.
Va Code Ann. § 38.2‐3430.1:1.
116 See Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, § 2 (stating that no Arizonan shall be forced “to participate in any health care system” or be
required to pay a fine for paying directly for health care); Okla. Const. art. II, § 37 (providing essentially the same guarantee).

toral campaigns to build public participation in the discourse of individual liberty as supe‐
rior to collective obligation.117
III. Citizenship Practices and the Patient Protection
Affordable Care Act
In this Part, I argue for using a concept of citizenship practices to understand the so‐
cio‐legal relationship between individuals and social insurance programs. As I use it, the
term “citizenship practices” incorporates the functional components of citizen‐like activi‐
ties, such as participation in governance, and also captures the ways in which the design of
social welfare laws shapes individual and social understandings of identity and belonging. I
describe some of the most important structural design questions that remain open for deci‐
sion during the implementation phase of PPACA, with a focus on points that will enhance or
curb the potential for citizen engagement in governance. I close this Part with commentary
on possible future social meanings of PPACA.
A. The Concept of “Citizenship Practices”
Throughout this Article, I have sought to build on the usefulness of citizenship as a me‐
taphor without becoming ensnared in its formal definition. The difficulties of navigating
that tension lead me to propose the term “citizenship practices” as a better tool for signify‐
117 See, e.g., Laura Ingraham, The Obama Diaries 119 (2010) (expressing the point of view that PPACA infringes on con‐

stitutional rights); Bill O’Reilly, Pinheads and Patriots: Where You Stand in the Age of Obama 57‐60 (2010) (describing
PPACA and arguing that it passed only because of political maneuvering); Michael Savage, Trickle Up Poverty 115‐53 (2010) (dis‐
cussing PPACA’s shortcomings in language aimed at a lay audience); Sally C. Pipes, Repeal the Individual Mandate of Obamacare,
HumanEvents.com (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38517 (describing the individual mandate as
“an egregious assualt on our economic liberty”); The Rush Limbaugh Show: Battle over Obamacare Repeal Is Essentially a De‐
bate About Liberty (Premier Radio Networks Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/
home/daily/site_121410/content/01125113.guest.html (arguing that PPACA infringes on the American people’s liberty by forc‐
ing them to buy health care).

ing a multi‐dimensional, nontechnical, and normative concept of citizenship, rather than
stretching citizenship as a metaphor so far that the word becomes almost meaningless.
I intend “citizenship practices” to denote both concrete activities and the social mean‐
ings associated with citizenship. Specifically, I mean it to denote the discourses, institu‐
tions, and statutory programs that comprise a network of social structures. This network
in turn gives birth to the constellation of rights, obligations, and belonging that we asso‐
ciate with citizenship. These structures exist within the state, the market, and contempo‐
rary civil society. “Citizenship practices” manifest in narrative, identities, and institutions,
as well as laws.
I specifically intend the term to build on the concept of “policy feedback”—the ways
that “policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes”118—as well as on
the idea of citizenship as metaphor. Theda Skocpol, a leading developer of the idea of poli‐
cy feedback, has described such effects as not only those that could transform state admin‐
istrative capacity but also those that can affect the identities, political goals, and capabilities
of social groups.119 PPACA will surely fulfill both possibilities, but it is the latter set of ef‐
fects that overlaps with citizenship practices, insofar as they help to frame narratives about
who is responsible for what and why, and who has a legitimate expectation of participatory
engagement in policymaking.

118 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States 58

(1992).

119 Id.

Policy and program design are key forces in structuring the ways in which individuals
and social welfare systems interact. The particulars of such design will shape whether me‐
chanisms exist that can force, enhance, or limit public participation in deliberation, as well as
how successful such mechanisms will be. In turn, answers to those questions will foretell the
extent to which interest groups will form and flourish around the needs of program constitu‐
ents. From these roots, perceptions will arise about how, why, and for whom the programs
operate.
B. The Design of Exchanges Under PPACA
In the health care arena, alternative modes of citizenship practices could be especially
important. Voters elect officials who determine health policies, but it is usually not possi‐
ble to unbundle health from other issues. Moreover, citizen engagement with respect to
elections is low, as captured by Michael Walzer’s description of citizens as “spectators who
vote.”120 Exchange‐level entities, on the other hand, could provide more localized oppor‐
tunities for developing citizenship skills such as self‐governance and leadership, as well as
a venue in which smaller decisions may ultimately shape larger and more distant policy‐
making. Two critically important issues for the development of citizenship practices and
policy feedback dynamics under PPACA will be whether the new institutions created pur‐
suant to PPACA could also create potential sites for policy entrepreneurs seeking to maxim‐
ize democratic input into health policy to intervene, and whether these institutions will fa‐

120 Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in The Citizenship Debates 291, 300 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).

cilitate an allegiance to norms of social insurance on the part of those who participate in
them.
Section 1311 of PPACA requires states to establish “American Health Benefit Ex‐
changes” by January 1, 2014.121 PPACA distinguishes between exchanges for individual
purchasers of health insurance and exchanges for small businesses seeking to find coverage
for their employees (the “Small Business Health Options Program”), and allows states to
choose between creating two exchanges or one that will serve both markets.122 Alterna‐
tively, states may join with one another to create regional insurance exchanges,123 offering
consumers increased economies of scale and portability, or may opt into a federally run ex‐
change.124 In addition to creating a competitive marketplace for insurance and pooling risk
for groups that traditionally have been hard to cover, the exchanges will also channel eligi‐
ble individuals into Medicaid, CHIP, and other public programs.125
PPACA provides initial funding for the exchanges,126 but leaves states considerable dis‐
cretion in structuring the design and implementation thereof, creating a fundamentally fe‐

121 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010). If by January 1, 2013, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services determines that a state has not taken the necessary steps toward establishing an exchange and will not have a functional
exchange in place by 2014, the Secretary will establish and operate an exchange in that state. Id. § 1321(c), 42 U.S.C.A. §
18041(c).
122 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b)(1)–(2).
123 Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(f)(1). New Mexico, for example, interprets the benefits of a regional exchange to include in‐
creased long‐run efficiencies and expanded portability for residents. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep’t, Implementing Federal
Health Care Reform—A Roadmap for New Mexico 26 (2010).
124 See PPACA § 1321(c) (authorizing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to establish exchanges in non‐
compliant states after January 1, 2013).
125 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4).
126 Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(a). The Health Insurance Exchange Planning grant provides states with funding for economic
modeling, actuarial analyses, data collection, and identification of necessary resources such as information technology to create an
exchange. Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(a)(1)–(3). Forty‐eight states and the District of Columbia received the first round of grants in Sep‐
tember 2010. Office of Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Initial Guidance to States on Ex‐

deralist system for procuring health insurance for individuals and small businesses. It is
likely that most states will exercise the opportunity to create their own exchanges in order
to streamline coordination with related state programs such as Medicaid and to tailor the
exchange to their population’s needs.127
With little statutory guidance on exchange functions, structure, and governance, states
have a great deal of discretion to exercise in a short window of time.128 The most likely
models exist in Massachusetts, Utah, and states that, like California, were among the earli‐
est to create exchanges.129 In 2006, when Massachusetts imposed its own mandate on state
residents, it created the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector to help individuals
purchase affordable coverage.130 The Massachusetts Connector provided a template for the
exchange system established in PPACA.131 Utah created a similar exchange in 2009,132 and
California enacted legislation in 2010 creating the California Health Benefit Exchange.133
These three models are likely to guide other states as they make decisions regarding im‐
portant governance issues in the process of creating PPACA compliant exchanges. Two

changes
(2010),
available
at
http://www.healthcare.gov/center/regulations/
guidance_to_states_on_exchanges.html.
127 For example, New Mexico’s strategic plan for health care reform has identified these reasons as sufficient to justify the
expense of establishing its own exchange. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep’t, supra note 123, at 25‐26; see also Robert Carey,
State Coverage Initiatives, Health Insurance Exchanges: Key Issues for State Implementation 2‐3 (2010), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/70388.pdf (describing why states will likely prefer to create their own exchanges, rather
than be subject to a federally run exchange). In addition, the New Mexico Human Services Department has noted that “ambitious
federal timelines” may prohibit development of a regional exchange. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep’t, supra note 123, at
26‐27.
128 See Jost, supra note 97, at 5 (noting that states face a “daunting list of tasks”).
129 See Rachel Brand, Facing the Future: Setting up Health Insurance Exchanges is One of the Big, Early Tasks for Lawmak‐
ers, State Legislatures, at 22, 24‐26, Oct.–Nov. 2010 (discussing early state efforts at exchange creation).
130 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 176Q, § 3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
131 See Staff of Senate Fin. Comm., 111th Cong., Description of Policy Options: Expanding Health Care Coverage: Pro‐
posals to Provide Affordable Coverage to All Americans 4 (2009) (“[T]he Health Insurance Exchange concept is similar in some
ways to the Massachusetts Connector . . . .”).
132 Utah Code Ann. § 31A‐2‐218(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
133 California Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ch. 655, sec. 3, § 15438(s)(1), 2010 Cal. Stat. 3553, 3556 (to be
codified at Cal. Gov’t Code § 15438).

such issues are whether an exchange will act as a clearinghouse or as an active purchaser
of plans, and whether the exchange will be housed in a government agency or a nonprofit
entity.
1. Regulation
States must determine how much oversight they will exercise over health insurance
plans offered through their exchanges. PPACA restricts entry to the exchange to those
plans whose availability in an exchange serves the “interests of qualified individuals and
qualified employers,”134 those that offer at least silver and gold benefit tiers, and those that
meet additional criteria to be established by the Secretary.135 States may opt to impose ad‐
ditional participation requirements on plans, allowing the exchange to serve as a gatekee‐
per to maximize quality and minimize cost.136
Some states may follow the Utah Health Exchange model, and provide a “clearing‐
house” of health insurance plans that meet the federal minimum standards.137 This mod‐
el, which could be analogized to various online commercial websites, would allow con‐
sumers the greatest number of options, but may fall short of providing them with the best

134 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(1) (West Supp. 1B 2010).
135 Id. § 1301, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021(a)(1)(c)(ii).
136 Initial guidance from the Department of Health and Human Services endorses the variety of models, leaving the choice

up to states. See Office of Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, supra note 126 (“States have a range of options for how the Ex‐
change operates from an ‘active purchaser’ model . . . to an ‘open marketplace’ model . . . .”).
137 Utah’s exchange model has been described as functioning as a “market organizer.” See Robert Carey, State Coverage
Initiatives, Preparing for Health Reform: The Role of the Health Insurance Exchange 4‐5 (2010), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/57093.pdf (describing how the exchange acts as a source of information about available
plans, provides structure to the market, and serves as a broker by handling billing and collection).
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States that choose to impose greater regulation on the plans offered through the ex‐
change could adopt what has been termed a “selective contracting agent” model.138 Under
such a model, the exchange would evaluate insurance plans from different corners and of‐
fer only selected plans.139 The Massachusetts Connector operates this way,140 and has thus
far granted entry to nine health plans. California’s exchange will also selectively contract
with plans to create a market of “optimal combination of choice, value, quality, and ser‐
vice,”141 limiting participation to those plans offering five tiers of coverage (ranging from
catastrophic‐only to platinum coverage) both on and off of the exchange.142 Other states
struggling with rising health care costs may find this selective contracting option attractive,
as it will allow regulators to best control premium growth.143
Finally, states could take more initiative in governing which plans will be offered
through their exchanges by acting as “active purchasers” of the health insurance plans of‐
fered.144 Under such a structure, the state exchanges would be able to operate as large em‐
ployers already do, negotiating prices for a large risk pool and offering access only to the
plans with the best bids.
138 Carey, supra note 127, at 12.
139 Id.
140 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 176Q, § 3(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (noting that the Connector’s purpose is to establish

procedures for selecting and certifying plans to be offered).
141 Cal. Health Care Found., California’s Insurance Exchange: Experts Tackle the Big Questions 6‐7 (2010) (quoting
Sumi Sousa, Special Assistant to Assembly Speaker John A. Perez).
142 See id. at 11 (noting that the California exchange requirements will exceed federal requirements).
143 New Mexico has identified cost control as a reason to consider limiting exchange participation to plans restricting
premium growth or offering other cost containing measures to keep premiums low. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep’t, supra
note 127, at 25‐26.
144 See Carey, supra note 137, at 5 (listing California’s PacAdvantage and the Texas Insurance Purchasing Alliance as ex‐
amples of the active purchaser models).

One policy analyst has noted that these latter two models allow the exchanges to fulfill
their full potential as “critical forces in the market to keep prices down and generate better
quality care for consumers, employers and taxpayers.”145 Though these models envision a
greater role, and thus greater effort, by the states, the models likely will provide consumers
with a more streamlined way to purchase health insurance that will be valuable to them
and responsive to their needs. Regardless of the model chosen, after allowing a plan to en‐
ter the exchange, a state must regularly account for premium increases in determining its
continued viability for the exchange, thereby helping to control price.146
2. Public or Private Forms
Second, the law requires each state to create an exchange as either a “governmental
agency or nonprofit entity . . . established by a State,”147 meaning that a state that does not
utilize the federally run exchange must house an exchange within the government or
create a new nonprofit.148 Indeed some states have utilized one or the other of these
forms in order to reach a decision as to the form of the permanent structure.149

145 NAIC Exchange Subgroup Public Hearing ( July 22, 2010) (statement of Sabrina Corlette, Georgetown University Health
Policy Institute) (on file with author).
146 See PPACA §§ 1311, 10104(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(2) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (“The Exchange shall require health
plans seeking certification . . . to submit a justification for any premium increase prior to implementation of the increase . . . . The
Exchange shall take this information . . . into consideration when determining whether to make such health plan available
through the Exchange.”).
147 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(1).
148 Because state exchanges are required to be self‐sustaining by 2015, states are expected to prioritize issues of efficiency.
Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(5).
149 For example, Iowa created the Iowa Legislative Health Care Coverage Commission in 2009 to determine, among other
things, where to house an exchange that shall be operational by July 1, 2011. Act of May 19, 2009, ch. 118, § 1.1.a(f), 2009 Iowa
Acts 391, 392. Colorado has instead charged its Division of Insurance with identifying the necessary changes to Colorado law
that PPACA will require. See Lorez Meinhold, Office of the Governor, Implementing Health Care Reform: A Roadmap for

Efficiency considerations150 may be in tension with other concerns. A publicly run ex‐
change would be directly linked with the state’s administration, facilitating communication
with related government bodies (including the state Medicaid office, insurance department,
and consumer protection agency).151 State‐operated exchanges will also likely offer greater
transparency, a factor that California considered in deciding to create an independent gov‐
ernment entity.152 However, despite ease of communications with related entities, state
bureaucracy and political considerations may slow or complicate decisionmaking, hiring,
and contracting.153 Creating an independent or quasigovernmental public agency—or a
nonprofit organization—could alleviate some of these concerns by uncoupling these func‐
tions from politicians but would reduce the efficiencies gained by having direct contact
with state agencies.154
Additionally, state‐run exchanges may pose bigger conflict‐ofinterest problems.155 For
example, Connecticut recently created SustiNet, a state‐run health plan that will be offered
on Connecticut’s exchange if it is certified as a qualified plan.156 SustiNet’s Board of Direc‐
tors has noted that governance of the state‐run plan and the exchange must be entirely dis‐
Colorado 13 (2010) (noting that the Colorado Division of Finance is inventorying PPACA and state insurance law).
150 See PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(5) (imposing limitations on allocation of funds, including restrictions on waste‐
ful expenditures).
151 See, e.g., American Health Benefit Exchange Model Act, § 4(A) drafting note (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Draft 2010)
(addressing benefits of locating insurance exchanges in a state agency as opposed to other models).
152 See Cal. Health Care Found., supra note 141, at 9 (“[California] decided on a government option principally because gov‐
ernment ‘has to conduct its business in the public.’” (quoting Jennifer Kent, Deputy Sec’y for Legislation, Office of the Governor)).
153 Cf. id. (discussing the need to make the exchange’s structure “nimble”).
154 See Families USA, Implementing Health Insurance Exchanges: Options for Governance and Oversight 5‐6 (2011),
http://familiesusa2.org/assets/
available
at
pdfs/health‐reform/Exchanges‐Governance‐and‐Oversight.pdf (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of state “qua‐
si‐governmental” agencies to hosting the exchanges).
155 See Jon Kingsdale & John Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Reform: Six Design Issues for the States, 29 Health
Aff. 1158, 1159 (2010) (raising concerns about unfair discrimination among carriers).
156 SustiNet coverage is available immediately to Medicaid and HUSKY beneficiaries and state employees or retirees, and to
small or not‐for‐profit businesses and municipalities as of July 1, 2012. Nancy Wyman & Kevin Lembo, SustiNet Health P’ship
Bd. of Dirs., Implementing SustiNet Following Federal Enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010: A Preliminary Report to the Connecticut General Assembly 1 (2010).

tinct to avoid a conflict of interest and has recommended that Connecticut either opt into
the federal exchange or place SustiNet in the hands of a quasi‐governmental agency that is
removed from the state government.157
Finally, choosing between state and privately run exchanges will implicate basic capaci‐
ty concerns. The selected body must have the facility to govern the exchange, including
performing the minimum set of regulatory functions PPACA sets forth (e.g., certifying plans
to participate, making limited‐eligibility determinations, and monitoring benefits and plan
offerings) along with any additional requirements state law imposes. States opting to place
the exchange within the state government will likely create new entities, as extant bodies
are ill‐suited to perform governance functions,158 although some states may opt to place an
exchange within the state governor’s office, as Utah did.159 Other states—such as Massachu‐
setts, California, and Connecticut—have or are planning to create a new state agency, and
will appoint a small governing board (e.g., five to ten people) that includes individuals
representing the expertise the exchanges will demand (such as economists, actuaries, plan
benefit specialists, and health policy experts) along with representatives from interested par‐
ties (such as businesses, insurers, health care providers, and consumers).160 In addition,

157 Id.
158 See Jost, supra note 97, at 2‐6 (noting that Medicaid agencies may be incompetent to perform exchange regulatory func‐

tions, but that consumer protection agencies in some states may be appropriate bodies for the exchanges); see also Carey, supra
note 127, at 6 (noting that “natural homes” for an exchange may be found in state insurance departments, Medicaid agencies, and
administrators of state employee health benefits, but that all three lack specialized expertise in administering an exchange).
159 Utah housed its exchange within the Governor’s Office of Economic Development, under a new branch entitled the Of‐
fice of Consumer Health Services. Utah Code Ann. 63M‐1‐2504 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
160 For example, Connecticut’s Health Care Reform Advisory Board has recommended that the state create a board chaired
by the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management. The board’s composition should include an actuary, a plan benefit spe‐

states must exercise caution to avoid creating conflicts of interest.161 Even if a new entity is
created to govern an exchange, close interaction with related state agencies will be critical.
For example, a governor’s office will likely play a central role in appointing some or all of the
board members.162 Although exchanges will not be required to conduct eligibility determina‐
tions with respect to tax subsidies or exemptions,163 they will need close contact with state
Medicaid and insurance agencies to facilitate proper referrals of those eligible for public cov‐
erage.
3. Information Requirements and Consumer Participation
Two key goals of PPACA’s exchanges are to create greater information disclosure and to
foster public participation in the health insurance sector. The exchanges expand consumer
access to plan information and create avenues for public involvement in the decisionmak‐
ing process. The specific aims are to facilitate easy plan comparison, to maximize transpa‐
rency, and to boost competition. Moreover, this “two‐way street” will cultivate consumer

cialist, a health care economist, the Commissioners of Social Services, Public Health, and Insurance, and the State Comptroller, as
well as representatives from small and large businesses, insurers, providers, and consumers. Conn. Health Care Reform Advi‐
sory Bd., Final Report to Governor Rell and the General Assembly 10 (2010). Massachusetts’s Connector is governed by a
board composed of four public officers as well as six appointed members (three appointed by the office of the attorney general
and three by the governor’s office). Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 176Q, § 2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). The board governing California’s
exchange will include two members appointed by the governor, one each appointed by the state senate and house, and one ap‐
pointed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Act of Sept. 30, 2010, ch. 659, sec. 2, § 10500(a) 2010 Cal. Stat. 3598,
3599 (to be codified at Cal. Gov’t Code § 10500). For a discussion of the structure of governing boards of exchanges, see Jost,
supra note 97, at 6‐7.
161 States will likely have to prohibit representatives from the health care and insurance industries from board participa‐
tion. For example, California’s law prohibits a board member from seeking employment with an insurer, agent, broker, or health
care provider within one year of service, and bars any compensation during service. Sec. 2, § 10500(f)(2), 2010 Cal. Stat. at
3599. For a more in‐depth discussion, see Jost, supra note 97, at 6‐7 (discussing how to structure agency boards in order to pre‐
vent conflicts of interest).
162 See Jost, supra note 97, at 7 (noting that the most common state board structure will require the governor’s office to
appoint board members subject to approval by the legislature).
163 PPACA requires the Treasury to make subsidy payments directly to plans, meaning that a state exchange may decline
any involvement in the eligibility process. Cf. Cal. Health Care Found., supra note 141, at 5 (noting that this provision is differ‐
ent from the payment structure in Massachusetts).

participation in the structuring of exchanges and regulations, thereby augmenting public
acceptance of a changing health care market.
a. Providing Consumer Information
PPACA requires exchanges to facilitate easy comparisons of plan benefits, costs, and
policies, seeking to maximize competition among participating plans. More specifically, the
law requires states to provide, at a minimum, plain language summary information and
quality ratings.164 PPACA also requires states to engage hard‐to‐reach populations.165 For
assistance in providing this information, states may apply for grants to expand or create of‐
fices of health insurance consumer assistance or ombudsman programs.166
The plain language summaries of plan benefits,167 as well as quality ratings,168 will sup‐
plement information already available on a federally created website providing plan infor‐
mation.169 This information must incorporate data on provider accessibility, cost sharing,
health outcomes, readmission rates, safety and error reduction programs, medical‐loss ra‐

164 PPACA § 10104(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1B 2010).
165 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(6)(e).
166 Id. sec. 1002, § 2793, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg‐93 (West Supp. 1A 2010). In 2011, twenty‐nine million dollars of grant money

is available for the development or expansion of consumer assistance programs. Grants will be awarded by the Department of
Health and Human Services’s Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (OCIIO). Office of Consumer Info. & Ins.
Oversight, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., CFDA No. 93,519, Affordable Care Act—Consumer Assistance Program Grants
Initial Announcement: Invitation to Apply for F Y 2010, at 4 (2010).
167 PPACA § 10104(f)(2) (West Supp. 1B 2010). The format for plan summaries will be designed by the Secretary based on
input from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(F).
168 Ratings must be available for each tier of coverage, based on the relative quality and price of each participating plan, as
well as beneficiary satisfaction scores for plans serving over 500 individuals. Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(3)–(4).
169 PPACA requires the Department of Health and Human Services to create a website helping consumers to identify cover‐
age options by July 1, 2010. Id. § 1103, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18003.

tios, claims payment and denial policies, enrollment patterns, and wellness plans,170 and be
available via website as well as through a toll‐free hotline.171 States will have to determine
whether to make summary information binding on insurers, which may prevent plans from
attracting consumers based on misrepresentations.172 Although not required, additional
user‐friendly features will likely further stimulate increased competition. For example, the
Massachusetts Connector provides consumers with a side‐by‐side comparison of plans at a
given coverage level based on the user’s age, household size, and zip code.173 California’s
law authorizes the exchange board to require each participating plan to make an electronic
directory of network providers available to users.174
In addition to providing easily accessible information, PPACA requires states to take
steps to reach out to those least likely to use the exchange. While employed individuals will
receive notice of an available exchange from an employer,175 the state must target
hard‐to‐reach individuals in need of coverage, thereby increasing the efficacy of the

170 See, e.g., id. § 1001, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg‐17 (West Supp. 1A 2010) (requiring health insurance providers to cover well‐
ness programs). Additionally, plans participating on the exchanges must report data on in‐ and out‐of‐network provider availa‐
bility and cost sharing to the Department of Health and Human Services. See id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18003(c)(1)(B) (West Supp.
1B 2010) (detailing requirements for plan certification); id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18003(e)(2)–(3) (explaining that an exchange
may certify a health plan if it meets certification guidelines). For a discussion of reporting requirements, see Jost, supra note 97,
at 31‐32.
171 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4).
172 While PPACA requires that a plan summary must “accurately describe” the benefits and coverage a plan provides “so
that consumers may compare health insurance coverage and understand the terms of coverage (or exception to such coverage),”
it also requires that the summary direct the consumer to the plan itself to determine contractual details. Id. sec. 1001, §§
2715(a), (b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg‐15 (West Supp. 1A 2010); see also Jost, supra note 97, at 32‐34 (discussing the “accurately
describe” requirement and arguing that these descriptions should be legally binding).
173 See
Health
Connector,
MassGov.com,
https://www.mahealthconnector.org/
portal/site/connector (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
174 California Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ch. 655, sec. 8, § 100504(a)(9), 2010 Cal. Stat. 3553, 3563 (to be codi‐
fied at Cal. Gov’t Code § 100504).
175 PPACA requires employers to provide written notice to employees regarding the existence of an exchange and an em‐
ployee’s potential eligibility for a premium assistance tax credit and/or cost sharing reduction, as well as the potential loss of
employer contribution to an employer‐sponsored plan if the employee purchases coverage through the exchange. PPACA sec.
1512, § 18B, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218B.

mandate. PPACA also requires states to award grants to entities serving as “navigators.”176
These entities must perform outreach services, including public education campaigns, dis‐
tribution of information, and referrals to consumer assistance offices.177 Some states have
already created navigator‐type entities for public coverage options but will have to create
additional programs to target individuals likely to purchase coverage on the exchange. For
example, in New York, community‐based organizations, consumer assistance programs,
and facilitated enrollers conduct outreach to assist low‐income individuals in accessing
public coverage; New York will have to create navigators to provide information regarding
the new exchanges as well.178
b. Seeking Consumer Input
The inclusion of public participation in the implementation and functioning of the ex‐
changes will be another component of establishing effective exchanges that are responsive
to consumer needs.179 Citizen input will create a two‐way flow of plan information, poten‐
tially facilitating a dialogue about the efficacy of this revised health care market. PPACA
requires that states engage consumers during implementation of the exchanges and that
they seek continued input regarding plan quality.

176 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(i) (West Supp. 1B 2010).
177 Id.
178 See N.Y. State Health Found., Implementing Federal Health Care Reform: A Roadmap for New York State 32

(2010) (describing the duties of navigators and qualifications for eligibility to serve as a navigator in the state).
179 Including greater public participation in health plans themselves is also a component of PPACA. The law includes fund‐
ing for the establishment of the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (“CO‐OP”) program, which will both increase competition
and provide new consumer‐directed options to the health insurance market. PPACA § 1322, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18042.

To do this, PPACA mandates that states consult with diverse stakeholders in establish‐
ing exchanges, including health care consumers enrolled in qualified plans.180 Colorado has
taken the lead in engaging the public, holding weekly “office hours” with the director of
health‐reform implementation and organizing 150 outreach activities—including forums,
conferences, and press conferences—since April 2010.181 Other states have focused their
efforts to engage stakeholders on soliciting the opinions of varying interest groups by
creating diverse advisory boards, rather than opening the floor to the greater public.182
Whether the latter approach will constitute adequate “stakeholder involvement” remains
to be seen—to date, interim guidance issued by the Office of Consumer Information and In‐
surance Oversight (OCIIO) has been limited. OCIIO’s “Initial Guidance to States on Ex‐
changes” mentions the importance of public involvement in setting up the exchanges, stat‐
ing that “[s]uccessful exchanges will work closely with consumer advocates,” among other
stakeholders.183 Further regulatory guidance on the types of stakeholders to involve, the
degree of involvement, or the responsiveness of the exchange to public comment has not
been provided. Nonetheless, incorporating consumer input may prove beneficial even if
not a regulatory obligation. Indeed, even without this mandate, public input may prove to
be a necessary element of meeting the duty to ensure that certified plans are “in the inter‐
ests of qualified individuals and qualified employers.”184

180 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(6).
181 See Meinhold, supra note 149, at 26 (describing Colorado’s outreach activities).
182 See Getting Organized—How States Are Preparing to Implement National Health Reform, States in Action (The Com‐

monwealth Fund, New York, N.Y.), July–Aug. 2010, at 10‐12 (describing outreach efforts in Pennsylvania and Virginia).
183 Office of Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, supra note 126.
184 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(1).

In addition to their role in giving input on the establishment of the exchanges them‐
selves, citizens will also provide feedback on the health insurance plans offered through the
exchanges. Section 1311(c) of PPACA is the primary vehicle for the transmission of infor‐
mation about health insurance plans offered through the exchanges. As discussed above,
plan ratings will be based in part on an “enrollee satisfaction survey system” that §
1311(c)(4) requires the Secretary to establish.185 This survey system, modeled after the
system in place for the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program,186 and, similar to con‐
sumer review tools that have become ubiquitous in online markets for other products,187
provides an opportunity for consumers to comment on their satisfaction with their health
plans. These reviews will help structure the landscape of plans that are offered through the
exchanges. The enrollee‐satisfaction component is intended to “make the proposed health
care exchange easier to navigate while also providing consumers an effective way to hold
their insurance company accountable.”188
4. Summary
The characteristics described in this Part create only the potential for meaningful citi‐
zen engagement. System design will be critical in determining whether the capacity for ef‐
185 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(4).
186 Press Release, Sen. Mark Pryor, Pryor Adds Consumer‐Friendly Tool to Simplify Health Care Choices, Hold Insurance

Companies Accountable (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://pryor.senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfm?id=320497&.
187 See Ezra Klein, Mark Pryor Makes the Health Insurance Exchanges a Bit More Like Amazon.com, Wash. Post Blog (Dec. 7,
2009, 4:37 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
ezra‐klein/2009/12/mark_pryor_makes_the_health_in.html (comparing the survey system to consumer reviews prevalent on on‐
line shopping sites like Amazon.com).
188 Press Release, supra note 186.

fective citizenship practices is actually enhanced under PPACA.189 Its construction as a
private market‐based social insurance system with multiple risk pools, for example, posi‐
tions it differently than Social Security. Campbell found that the uniformity of rules in So‐
cial Security signals that each person’s participation is equally legitimate, which in turn
produces more such activity.190 PPACA is neither entirely uniform the way Social Security
is nor is it a fully means‐tested program like Medicaid.191
There is ample authority in PPACA for policymaking that would enhance participatory
governance, especially at the exchange level. Just as the impact of Social Security was un‐
known at the time of its enactment, the full potential for development of citizenship practices
under PPACA is currently unknown. Much will depend on state‐level initiatives and whether
federal officials permit or facilitate such initiatives.
C. Social Meanings of PPACA
Although one cannot be sure today of how significant the opportunities for the exercise
of participation rights may become under PPACA, the essential functions and components
of social insurance systems—which mimic citizenship norms—exist in PPACA’s structure.
First, PPACA creates a system of multiple mutual benefits among individual partici‐
pants. The benefits to each person are unpredictable and contingent: Person A may reap
only modest value from years of investment through the payment of premiums, but she is
189 See Campbell, supra note 73 at 125‐37 (describing survey results finding that participation rates differed across different
benefit programs); Cohen, supra note 48, at 23‐37, 66‐69, 345‐357 (describing the impact that consumers can have and the partici‐
pation and citizen activity of consumer movements throughout the twentieth century).
190 Campbell, supra note 73, at 138.
191 Campbell attributes lower levels of political engagement by participants in means‐tested programs in part to the contrast
between a professionalized Social Security bureaucracy that applies clear standards to an entire population and programs for the
needy characterized by stigma, red tape, and complex eligibility criteria. Id. at 129‐32.

virtually certain to realize some significant benefits over time. In such a system, formal
constraints are necessary to prevent free‐rider problems. Other mutual financial benefits
include protection against wasteful use of public funds to compensate providers for treat‐
ments furnished to the uninsured and the reduction of transaction costs in providing all
medical treatments.
There is also mutual benefit in the spillover of positive externalities that accrue to
population health and thus to participants collectively. Public health studies have shown
that insurance status is positively correlated with improved health outcomes for individu‐
als.192 Economic analyses suggest that increasing health insurance coverage in the United
States would result in large national‐level socio‐economic gains.193 In addition, recent out‐
breaks of infectious diseases, often on a global scale, indicate that removing barriers to
treatment for those exposed to such diseases is an important aspect of the defense of a
community.194
Second, PPACA creates reciprocal obligations. The system’s provision of health insur‐
ance will provide protection to the individual against possibly devastating financial risk in
exchange for the relatively minor obligation to purchase it. Government is in effect insur‐
ing the insurers. On a more philosophical level, the new law will strengthen social norms
192 See, e.g., Peter Franks et al., Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence from a National Cohort, 270 JAMA 737, 740
(1993) (finding that insurance has a similar effect on mortality as socioeconomic status, education, and self‐rated health).
193 See James A. Thorton & Jennifer L. Rice, Does Extending Health Insurance Coverage to the Uninsured Improve Popula‐
tion Health Outcomes?, 6 Applied Health Econ. & Health Pol’y 217, 228 (2008) (“[T]here may be large social economic benefits
and net benefits from extending health insurance coverage to the uninsured.”).
194 See, e.g., Matthew K. Wynia & Lawrence Gostin, The Bioterrorist Threat and Access to Health Care, 296 Science 1613,
1613 (2002) (noting that uninsured Americans who could not access evaluation and care for infectious disease pose a national
security threat in the event of a bioterrorism attack).

of solidarity and responsibility and extend a deeper consciousness of these norms to pub‐
lic discourse related to the health care system.
In sum, PPACA extends the functional aspects of citizenship to the American health care
system for the first time. Rather than privatizing health care, as has recently occurred in
nations that adopted a much more public system after World War II, the United States has
approached a social insurance system from essentially the opposite direction. PPACA re‐
tains a private system of market exchange, but “publicizes” it by importing a limited, but
significant, set of publicsector characteristics.
What remains missing is a coherent, broadly shared public narrative about the meaning
of PPACA. The frustration and delay of that component of the law’s potential has been the
primary achievement so far of the campaign of constitutional challenges against it. Assum‐
ing that the Supreme Court eventually upholds PPACA, the opening of the exchanges in
2014 may create a fresh opportunity for socialmeaning entrepreneurs to create the founda‐
tions for health care system citizenship practices.
Conclusion
Governance processes—and not simply the rules that establish program content and
eligibility—have a profound effect on whether the broader impact of a reform will be ex‐
pressive of democratic values. A social welfare reform of the magnitude of PPACA will al‐
most certainly generate new citizenship practices vis‐à‐vis the health system, although the
direction of that change is not yet clear. The two most important aspects of new citizenship
practices that could develop under PPACA are its potential, over time, to instantiate a new

reciprocal covenant of mutual security, and its potential to enhance participatory
self‐governance.
It will be years before we know whether the new health reform law will alter the social
meaning of membership in the American community, and if so, how. PPACA represents the
first attempt in U.S. history to provide (almost) universal health insurance, yet it does so in
a way that preserves a fragmented market and perpetuates structural inequalities in access
to coverage. As this Article goes to press, there is no assurance that the new law—and es‐
pecially the individual mandate—will even survive judicial scrutiny.195
Lacking a crystal ball and in recognition of two earlier, bitterly fought efforts to secure
new public goods, let me close by borrowing from both Benjamin Franklin196 and the health
reform proposal advanced by President Clinton197: What have we created by enacting
PPACA? It’s a health security system, if you can keep it.

195 See supra note 98 (citing cases challenging PPACA).
196 Franklin engaged in the following exchange after the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention: “‘Well, Doctor, what

have we got—a Republic or a Monarchy?’ ‘A Republic, if you can keep it.’” Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations
from the Library of Congress 299 (Suzy Platt ed., 1992).
197 See American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong. § 101 (1993) (“establish[ing] . . . a State‐Based American
Health Security Program” (emphasis added)).

